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FOREWORD
The ever-increasing importance of government contracts has enhanced the need
for a comprehensive discussion of the problems connected with their use. Continuing
this discussion, as commenced in the preceding part of this symposium, part two
begins with an examination of the extent to which federal procurement policies are
either internally consistent or consistent with other policies outside the procurement
field, such as those embodied in the antitrust laws or in "free trade."
Placing "emphasis on government" in the study of government contracts, the
second article calls attention to the importance of "interior" government relations-
for example, the interaction between Congress and its committees, on the one hand,
and the executive departments and agencies, on the other. The courts also are
placing "emphasis on government" when, as in the much-discussed G. L. Christian
case,' they have given federal procurement regulations the force of statutory law
and have read the provisions of these regulations into government contracts from
which they had been omitted by the parties. Such judicial holdings lend greater
plausibility to the argument presented here in one article that government contracts
are contracts of adhesion, as to which the excuse of impossibility of performance
should be generously applied by boards of contract appeals and by the Court of
Claims.
Since procurement costs are a major item in the federal budget, efforts to control
and reduce these costs loom large in campaigns for governmental economy. In one
such effort Congress passed the defective pricing law, which, however, seems to
have touched off a storm of controversy and to have resulted in some inequities
in procurement. The Department of Defense, relying on competition as a cost-saving
pricing technique, has increased efforts to "break out" specifications that would be
subject to competitive bids; also, in many instances it has replaced cost-plus-fixed-fee
with incentive contracts. On the other hand, the Atomic Energy Commission,
distinguishing its problems from those of Defense, is continuing its use of manage-
ment contracts and seeking cost reduction through other means.
By reason of the oft-heard criticism that federal procurement has discriminated
against small business,' the symposium contains two articles which center on the
'G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (1963), motion for rehearing and
reargument denied, 320 F.2d 345 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), rehearing denied, 376
U.S. 929 (1964).
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participation by small businessmen in government contracts. One takes the view
that small businessmen are getting a fair share of such contracts and that in some
respects the governmental efforts to help them-as by the strong preference for
advertising bidding methods-runs counter to their own preferences. The other
article points to the governmental assistance available to small business through
the set-aside program and certificates of competency. That other forms of assistance
may also be available appears from the article on financing defense contracts.
In some industries, such as aerospace, government contracts play a major role in
determining the utilization of manpower; and often this utilization has involved
a waste which can no longer be afforded. Elimination of one barrier to efficient
manpower utilization should result from the vigorous federal program to provide
equal employment opportunity-a program discussed in both parts of the sym-
posium. Federal concern with labor conditions is also reflected in legislation de-
signed to assure that insistence on competitive bidding for government contracts
will not become a leverfor depressing wage levels. And the Miller Act seeks to
assure payment of laborers working on federal construction projects, as well as
payment of the persons furnishing material for such projects.
A businessman's most valuable asset is often his technical "know-how"; and
naturally he does not want to lose that asset by entering into a government contract.
On the other hand, from the government's standpoint one purpose of the contract
may be to obtain free and easy access to this "know-how," including the contractor's
proprietary data and trade secrets. Two articles in the symposium discuss the
proper adjustment of these conflicting viewpoints.
The government relies heavily on business and educational organizations to
generate new ideas and perform basic and applied research. But to what extent and
in what manner should the government underwrite these activities? One article
urges that improvements be made in integrating independent research and develop-
ment into the government's total program of support for research.
Procurement of basic research is especially difficult to fit into the format of a
government contract; and so Congress authorized grants to nonprofit institutions for
"basic scientific research." Unfortunately, as pointed out in the final article, the
term "grant" and the relative absence of restrictions may have induced some mis-
interpretation of the responsibilities of the grantee.
The brief reference in this foreword to some of the topics covered in part two
of the symposium does little justice to the detailed and thoroughgoing analyses in
the various articles. However, perhaps it will indicate the potentiality of this
symposium in helping to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the
contemporary role of government contracts.
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